The Subrogation Strategist

Unless Congress moves quickly, several amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence will take effect December 1, 2024. Below is a brief description of the amendments.

Rules of Evidence

Rule 107 is a new rule. This rule addresses illustrative aids, stating that, if such aid helps the trier of fact to understand the evidence or an argument, a party may use the aid if its utility is not substantially outweighed by the danger of, among other things, unfair prejudice. As noted under the discussion of Rule 1006, below, an illustrative aid - offered only to help the trier of ... Continue Reading

In Myers v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., No. CL-2024-0010, 2024 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 119, the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama (Appeals Court) issued a per curium opinion addressing whether the trial court properly awarded damages for loss-of-use for an irreparable, privately owned vehicle. Finding that it had to follow prior precedent from the Supreme Court of Alabama (Supreme Court), the Appeals Court reversed the trial court’s decision.Continue Reading

If a fire or flood destroys a high-net-worth client’s fine art collection, an insurer who pays out a claim related to the loss has an incentive to pursue subrogation. This article explores some of the issues an insurer should “canvas” before pursuing subrogation for these types of claims.

Damage to fine art can occur in a number of ways. For instance, fine art may be damaged in a natural disaster - such as a flood or a wildfire. Artwork may also be accidentally damaged because of a transportation-related incident physically damaging the art. In addition, artwork may suffer fire or smoke damage from a fire within a building. Another possibility is that the artwork suffers damage because of renovations either to the insured’s home or a neighboring property. For example, a renovation contractor may damage artwork due to vibrations or leaking water. A construction worker, moreover, may turn with a tool in his hand, or trip and fall, damaging the artwork.Continue Reading

In Westminster Am. Ins. Co. a/s/o Androulla M. Toffalli v. Bond, No. 538 EDA 2023, 2023 Pa. Super. LEXIS 626, 2023 PA Super 272, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (Appellate Court) recently discussed the impact of silence on the Sutton Rule with respect to the landlord, Androulla M. Toffalli (Landlord), securing insurance. After holding that the tenant, Amy S. Bond (Bond) t/a Blondie’s Salon – who leased both commercial and residential space in the building pursuant to written leases – was not an implied “co-insured” on Landlord’s insurance policy, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court.

In this case, Bond rented the ground floor of a property located in Monroe County pursuant to a written commercial lease (Commercial Lease) and operated Blondie’s salon out of the leased location. In addition, Bond rented and lived in a second-floor apartment pursuant to a residential lease (Residential Lease). Both leases required the tenants (Tenants) to obtain insurance for personal items. The leases, however, did not require Landlord to obtain fire insurance for the property.Continue Reading

The discovery rule applies to latent injuries, such that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of or should have known of the injury. In Western World Ins. Group v. KC Welding, LLC, No. 2022-CA-00527-SCT, 2023 Miss. LEXIS 278 (KC Welding), a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court of Mississippi (Supreme Court) affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Western World Insurance Group (Insurer) filed its lawsuit one day late. Thus, the statute of limitations barred Insurer’s lawsuit.

In KC Welding, on July 12, 2018, KC Welding, LLC (KC Welding) sent an employee to Sunbelt Shavings, LLC (Sunbelt) to repair the door of a box containing wood chips. Sunbelt’s employees discovered that KC Welding employees were welding a storage bin that had not been emptied of wood chips and Sunbelt’s employees asked KC Welding’s employees to leave. After that, Sunbelt’s employees attempted to soak the area with water. Later than night, a fire started on Sunbelt’s property, apparently as the result of smoldering wood shavings, a fire that was extinguished on July 13, 2018.Continue Reading

In April, the Supreme Court sent a list of proposed amendments to Congress that amend the Federal Rules of Evidence. Absent action by Congress, the rules go into effect December 1, 2023.  The proposed amendments affect Rules 106, 615 and, relevant to this article, 702.

Rule 702 addresses testimony by an expert witness. The proposed rule reads as follows (new material is underlined; matters omitted are lined through):

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.Continue Reading

In subrogation cases where the insured’s damages were caused by a defective product, the fact that the product at issue is or was subject to a recall announced by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) may help to establish that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s possession and control. On August 31, 2023, the CPSC announced the following recalls related to products that present fire hazards:

1. Electrolux Group Recalls Frigidaire Gas Cooktops Due to Risk of Gas Leak, Fire Hazard. According to the CPSC’s website, “[p]lastic control knobs with a ...

On May 4, 2023, Montana changed its product liability laws when the Governor signed SB 216, which was effective upon passage and applies to claims that accrue on or after May 4, 2023. Among the changes is the adoption of a sealed container defense and the application of comparative negligence principles in strict liability actions. Montana also adopted a defense based on certain actions not being brought within 10 years. In addition, Montana adopted a rebuttable presumption with respect to a product’s defective condition. A jury must be informed about this rebuttable presumption with respect to certain warnings claims, premarket licensing procedures or claims involving drugs and/or medical devices. The changes to the Montana Code are further described below.

On April 13, 2023, Florida’s governor, Ron DeSantis, signed into law SB 360 which, among other things, shortens the statute of repose period for improvements to real property. The law also revises the date on which the statute of limitations period runs for these types of damage claims. Florida’s revision of this law provides further evidence of the state’s tort reform efforts.Continue Reading

On April 7, 2023, New Mexico’s governor, Michelle Lujan Grisham, signed into law New Mexico’s Right to Repair Act (Act), 2023 N.M. SB 50. The Act’s effective date is July 1, 2023. The Act applies to construction defects in dwellings, i.e., newly constructed single family housing units designed for residential use. The Act applies to not only newly constructed housing units but also to systems and other components and improvements that are part of the housing unit at the time of construction.

Pursuant to the Act, except for construction defect claims that involve an immediate ... Continue Reading

On Friday, March 24, 2023, Florida’s governor, Ron DeSantis, signed into law a tort reform bill, HB 837.  The bill impacts, among other things, bad faith actions and attorney’s fee awards.  Of particular importance to subrogation professionals are provisions impacting comparative fault, the statute of limitations and premises liability with respect to the criminal acts of third persons.

With respect to the statute of limitations, the bill amended Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) and (4), to reduce the statute of limitations for negligence actions from four (4) years to two (2) years.

As for comparative fault, Fla. Stat. § 768.81 was amended to move Florida from a pure comparative fault jurisdiction for negligence actions to a modified comparative fault jurisdiction.  Pursuant to § 768.81(6), as revised, in a negligence action subject to that section, “any party found to be greater than 50 percent at fault for his or her own harm may not recover any damages.”  Section 768.81(6), however, does not apply to actions for damages for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence.Continue Reading

In United States Aviation Underwriters v. Turnberry Airport Holdings, LLC, No. 3D22-270, 2023 Fla. App. LEXIS 1207 (U.S. Aviation), the Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District (Appellate Court) considered whether the insurer for a commercial landlord could pursue subrogation against the landlord’s tenant.  Based on the terms of the lease between the landlord and the tenant, the Appellate Court held that the landlord’s insurer could not pursue subrogation.

In U.S. Aviation, the defendant, Turnberry Airport Holdings, LLC (Turnberry Airport) leased space to an insured aircraft owner.  The lease contained the following provision:

TENANT agrees that all policies of insurance obtained by it in connection with the Space or as required hereunder shall contain appropriate waiver of subrogation clauses.Continue Reading

In J&J Fish on Ctr. Str., Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-644-bhl, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16361, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin (District Court) recognized that “[t]here will be no further fish fries on Center Street until someone pays to repair the collapsed floor at J&J Fish on Center Street, Inc. (J&J Fish).”  The contenders were:  1) J&J Fish; 2) its’ insurer, Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company (Insurer); and 3) J&J Fish’s landlord, Vision Land, LLC (Vision). Recognizing Insurer’s right to subrogate against Vision based on the terms of the parties’ lease, the District Court held Insurer owed J&J Fish coverage for the losses it sustained, but that Insurer could subrogate against Vision for anything it had to pay J&J Fish.Continue Reading

The obvious answer to the question is “yes” if there is a viable target. However, since I work for the subrogation department of a law firm, some may consider the answer to be a bit biased. Despite any misplaced perception of bias, there are benefits to insureds, insurers and society as a whole when insurers pursue subrogation. These benefits support having insurers pursue subrogation.Continue Reading

For all cases filed after May 13, 2022, Georgia has amended its apportionment of fault statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33. The amendment affects subsection (b), which formerly stated that in actions brought against “more than one person for injury to person or property,” the amount of damages awarded, after taking a reduction for the plaintiff’s percentage of fault, shall be apportioned among the person or persons liable according the each person’s percentage of fault. It also eliminated joint liability and the right of contribution. The amended subsection (b) now applies to actions brought “against one or more persons,” thus allowing courts to apply the statute to single-defendant lawsuits.Continue Reading

Many courts enforce forum selection clauses in contracts between parties. In W. Bay Plaza Condo. Ass’n v. Sika Corp., No. 3D21-1834, 2022 Fla. App. LEXIS 1637 (W. Bay Plaza), the Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District (Court of Appeal) answered the question of whether a mandatory forum selection clause in a manufacturer’s warranty was enforceable as to a condominium association, who was a non-signatory. The trial court enforced the forum selection clause – calling for litigation in New Jersey rather than Florida – and the Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling.Continue Reading

In subrogation cases where the insured’s damages were caused by a defective product, the fact that the product at issue is or was subject to a recall announced by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) may help to establish that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s possession and control. On January 26, 2022, the CPSC announced the following recall related to a product that presents a fire hazard:

Eguana Technologies Recalls Evolve Home Energy Storage Systems with LG Battery Due to Fire Hazard.

According to the CPSC’s website, “[t]he lithium-ion ... Continue Reading

Statutes of repose establish a legislature’s determination of when defendants should be free from liability. As set forth in Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 11.202, the statute of repose for construction improvements in Nevada is six years after “substantial completion.” In Somersett Owners Ass’n v. Somersett Dev. Co., 492 P.3d 534 (Nev. 2021), the Supreme Court of Nevada (Supreme Court) discussed when a construction improvement is substantially complete, as defined by the common law, for purposes of NRS 11.202. Because the plaintiff did not establish that its suit was filed within six years of when the rockery walls at issue were substantially complete, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court below.Continue Reading

Rhode Island’s governor, Daniel McKee, signed 2021 R.I. HB 5867/2021 R.I. SB 736 into law on July 13, 2021. The enactment changes Rhode Island’s products liability law and impacts how courts treat a manufacturer’s or seller’s claim that it is not liable due to a subsequent alteration or modification of the product.Continue Reading

Whether Amazon can be held strictly liable for products sold by third parties through its website is a question courts often face. In Loomis v. Amazon.com, LLC, No. 297995, 2021 Cal. App. LEXIS 347 (Apr. 26, 2021), the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District (Second District), held that, under the circumstances, Amazon could be held strictly liable.Continue Reading

Many states, finding that the purpose of the strict liability doctrine is to protect otherwise defenseless victims from defective products, hold that principles of comparative negligence do not apply to strict liability actions. Georgia is not one of those states. In Johns v. Suzuki Motor of Am., S19G1478, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 760, the Supreme Court of Georgia recently held that Georgia’s comparative fault statute, OCGA § 51-12-33, applies to strict products liability claims brought pursuant to Georgia’s product liability statute, OCGA § 51-1-11.Continue Reading

Pursuant to the equitable made whole doctrine, where there are limited funds available, an insurer cannot pursue subrogation until the insured has been made whole – i.e., fully compensated – for its injuries. In City of Asbury Park v. Star Ins. Co., No. A-20, 083371, 2020 N.J. LEXIS 746, the Supreme Court of New Jersey (Supreme Court) addressed the question of whether the equitable made whole doctrine applies to first-dollar risk an insured takes on, such as a deductible or self-insured retention (SIR). More specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether the insured, here the City of Asbury Park, was entitled to recover all its $400,000 SIR before the insurer, Star Insurance Company (Insurer) could assert its subrogation rights. The court held that the made whole doctrine does not apply to first-dollar risk allocated to the insured.Continue Reading

In Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020), the Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, addressed whether a party’s contractual definition of the phrase “substantial completion” controlled the trigger date for California’s construction-related statute of repose, Cal. Civ. Code § 941(a). The Fourth District held that the agreement between the condominium owner and developer for Smart Corner Condominiums and the general contractor, Hensel Phelps Construction Co. (Hensel Phelps) – which determined the date of “substantial completion” for the construction project - did not control when the statute of repose started to run.Continue Reading

Courts often struggle with the question of when the statute of repose starts to run for construction projects that involve multiple buildings or phases. In Village Lofts at St. Anthony Falls Ass’n v. Housing Partners III-Lofts, LLC, 937 N.W.2d 430 (Minn. 2020) (Village Lofts), the Supreme Court of Minnesota addressed how Minnesota’s 10-year statute of repose, Minn. Stat. § 541.051, applies to claims arising from the construction of a condominium complex. The court held that the statute of repose begins to run at different times for: a) statutory residential warranty claims brought pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 327A.01 to 327A.08, et. seq.; and b) common law claims arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of the condominium buildings.Continue Reading

In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:18CV166-M-P, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189053 (Oct. 31, 2019), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi considered a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by defendant Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon). Amazon argued that, because it was a “service provider” who cannot be held liable under Mississippi’s Product Liability Act (MPLA), Miss. Code § 11.1.63, the negligence and negligent failure to warn claims filed against it by plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm) failed as a matter of law. The court, looking beyond the MPLA, held that State Farm’s complaint stated a claim against Amazon.Continue Reading

Since the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), parties proceeding in product liability cases in Pennsylvania often disagree about jury instructions. In Davis v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., No. 1405 EDA 2018, 2019 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2763, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in an unpublished opinion,[1] recently addressed whether the trial court gave proper jury instructions in a products liability case against Volkswagen entities, including Volkswagen Aktiengeselleschaft (Volkswagen). The court held that, despite a statement in Tincher that the plaintiff is the “master of the claim,” the trial court properly instructed the jury on both the consumer expectation test and the risk-utility test for establishing that the product at issue, a Volkswagen Passat, was in a defective condition.Continue Reading

Although there are times when both parties agree on the need to perform destructive tests on an object, when the parties disagree, the party seeking the destructive tests must justify its request. In Doerrer v. Schreiber Foods, Inc., et al., No. 2017-08582, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4743, the Second Department of the Supreme Court of New York’s Appellate Division recently explained what a defendant moving to secure destructive testing needs to show in order to perform the testing it seeks.Continue Reading

Arizona recently amended its Purchaser Dwelling Action statute to, among other things, involve all contractors in the process, establish the parties’ burdens of proof, add an attorney fees provision, establish procedural requirements and limit a subcontractor’s indemnity exposure. The governor signed the bill—2019 Ariz. SB 1271—on April 10, 2019.  The following discussion details some of the changes to the law.Continue Reading

In Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Frances Todd, Inc. 2019 Cal. App. Lexis 299, the Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, addressed whether a commercial condominium association’s carrier could subrogate against the tenants (aka lessees) of one of its member unit owners. After examining the condominium association’s declarations, as well as the lease terms between the owner and the lessees, the court held that the association’s carrier could not subrogate against the lessees because they were implied co-insureds on the policy. To reach its decision, the court explained that an insurer steps into the shoes of its insured, not the party with whom it is in privity. Although the first-party property portion of the association’s insurance policy did not, as required by the association’s declarations, have the owner listed as an additional named insured, the court held that it would be inequitable to treat the association as the sole insured for purposes of determining Western Heritage’s right to bring a subrogation action.Continue Reading

Subrogating insurers often address waiver of subrogation clauses in the form contracts drafted by the American Institute of Architects. In ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Med. Plumbing, No. A-5395-16T4, 2019 N.J. Super. LEXIS 45 (App. Div.), ACE American Insurance Company (ACE) argued that the waiver clause in the AIA General Conditions form A201-2007 did not extend to the post-construction loss at issue. Adopting what the court termed the “majority” position, the Appellate Division held that, by reading §§ 11.3.5 and 11.3.7 together, the waiver applied to bar the insurer’s subrogation claim. The Appellate Court’s ruling makes pursuing subrogation against New Jersey contractors using AIA contract forms more difficult.Continue Reading

In Lawrence v. General Panel Corp., 2019 S.C. LEXIS 1, No. 27856 (S.C. Jan. 1, 2019), the Supreme Court of South Carolina answered a certified question related to South Carolina’s statute of repose, S.C. Code § 15-3-640,[1] to wit, whether the date of “substantial completion of the improvement” is always measured from the date on which the certificate of occupancy is issued. The court held that a 2005 amendment to § 15-3-640 did not change South Carolina law with respect to the date of substantial completion. Thus, under the revised version of § 15-3-640, “the statute of repose begins to run at the latest on the date of the certificate of occupancy, even if there is ongoing work on any particular part of the project.” A brief review of prior case law may assist with understanding the court’s ruling in Lawrence. Continue Reading

In Ybarra v. Greenberg & Sada, P.C., 2018 CO 81, 2018 Colo. LEXIS 828 (Oct. 15, 2018), Francis Ybarra (Ybarra) filed a complaint against the law firm retained by State Farm Auto Insurance Company (State Farm) to pursue subrogation against Ybarra. In his suit, Ybarra alleged that the law firm violated Colorado’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) when it secured a default judgment against Ybarra. The Supreme Court of Colorado, agreeing that State Farm’s subrogation claim was not a transaction giving rise to a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA, held that the trial court properly dismissed Ybarra’s complaint for failure to state a claim.Continue Reading

In N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 719 Fed. Appx. 691 (9^th Cir. 2018), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Appeals Court) addressed the question of whether an insurer, N.Y. Marine & General Insurance Company (N.Y. Marine), could recover from a cargo carrier under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, if the insured’s loss claim did not state a specified amount of money. Finding that § 14706 requires that a party filing a cargo loss claim state a specified or determinable amount of money, the Appeals Court affirmed the district court’s holding that neither the carrier, Estes Express Lines, Inc. (Estes) nor the broker, Exfreight Zeta, Inc. (Zeta), was liable to N.Y. Marine.Continue Reading

In Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Agility Logistics Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104179 (S.D.N.Y.), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered the “novel question” of whether the Montreal Convention allows recovery of inspection costs when there is no physical damage to the cargo at issue. Although acknowledging that its holding was, arguably, absurd, the court held that, based on the plain language of Article 18 of the Montreal Convention, the subrogating insurer could not recover the inspection costs its insured incurred.Continue Reading

Under Florida’s construction-related statute of repose, Fla. Stat. § 95.11, actions based on the design, planning or construction of an improvement to real property are barred if not commenced within 10 years after the later of several possible dates, including the date of actual possession by the owner and the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. The Florida Legislature recently amended the statute to extend the time within which defendants subject to a suit filed close to the end of the 10-year period can file claims. Under the revised law, a defendant can file “counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims up to 1 year after the pleading to which such claims relate is served.” Regardless of when the cause of action at issue accrued, the law applies to actions commenced on or after July 1, 2018, except that any action that would not have been barred under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(c) prior to the amendment may be commenced before July 1, 2019.Continue Reading

In Rodriguez v. City of New York, 2018 N.Y. LEXIS 793, 2018 NY Slip Op. 02287 (Apr. 3, 2018), New York’s Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, addressed the question of whether a plaintiff, in moving for summary judgment on the issue of the defendant’s liability, also needs to establish the absence of his or her own comparative negligence. In a 4-3 decision, a majority of the court held that, because the plaintiff’s comparative negligence is a matter of damages, not liability, the plaintiff does not bear that burden.Continue Reading

In McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 211 (Jan. 18, 2018), the Supreme Court of California addressed the question of whether California’s Right to Repair Act (Act), Civ. Code §§ 895-945.5, applies to claims where the plaintiff alleges that construction defects caused property damage. The court held that the Act - which applies to original construction intended to be sold as an individual dwelling unit - supplanted common law negligence and strict liability actions with a statutory claim under the Act. Thus, where the Act applies, the Act provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs seeking to recover for property damages arising from construction defects.Continue Reading

When an insurer files a subrogation suit in the insured’s name, questions often arise with respect to whether, by doing so, the insurer has to respond to discovery issued to the insured. In Aquatherm, LLC v. Centimark Corporation, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85173 (C.D. Utah June 2, 2017), a case in which the insurer at issue made the insured whole, the District Court for the District of Utah answered the question in the negative.Continue Reading

In the United States, to prove a products liability claim based upon a design defect, the plaintiff must either meet: (1) the consumer-expectation test, or (2) the risk-utility test, depending upon the jurisdiction. Although Nevada has historically followed the consumer-expectation test, in a recent decision the Supreme Court of Nevada evaluated whether to adopt the more stringent risk-utility test. Ultimately, the court rejected adoption of the risk-utility test and reaffirmed its prior precedent holding that a plaintiff need only meet the consumer-expectation test. See Ford Motor Company v. Trejo, 2017 Nev. LEXIS 90 (September 27, 2017).Continue Reading

In Forest City Stapleton, Inc. v. Rodgers, 393 P.3d 487 (Colo. 2017), the Supreme Court of Colorado considered whether a home buyer needed privity of contract to pursue an implied warranty of suitability claim against a developer who sold a vacant lot to a professional builder. Finding that that warranty of suitability claims are contractual claims, the court held that the home buyer needed to be in privity of contract with the developer.Continue Reading

When the validity of a construction defect claim depends on whether the claim is barred by the applicable state’s statute of repose, it is important to review the statute to identify when claims subject to the statute of repose accrue. In Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC, 219 So.3d 93 (Fla. Ct. App. (5^th Dist.) 2017), the Court of Appeals of Florida clarified the accrual date for the statute of repose in cases where the accrual date depends on a construction contract’s completion date. Pursuant to Busch, the date of full performance under the contract, not the building’s purchase closing date, is the date on which claims accrue.Continue Reading

In subrogation actions, the insurer, as subrogee, steps into the shoes of its insured. However, problems can arise when an insured has uninsured losses. In this situation, both the insurer and the insured have a right to file suit against the tortfeasor. The possibility of two different lawsuits raises a number of issues, such as whether: 1) proceeding separately impermissibly splits the cause of action; 2) the insured’s attorney is entitled to attorney’s fees under the common fund doctrine; and 3) the insurer can proceed before the insured is made whole. In light of these issues, subrogating insurers should proceed with caution before filing suit separately from the insured.Continue Reading

The California legislature recently enacted legislation – SB 496 – limiting a design professional’s indemnification obligations in private contracts related to design services. The term “design professional” refers to licensed architects, landscape architects and professional land surveyors, and registered professional engineers. As revised, Cal. Civ. Code § 2782.8 states that, for all contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2018 for design professional services, all provisions that purport to have the design professional indemnify the indemnitee for ... Continue Reading

By: Edward A. Jaeger, Jr. and William L. Doerler

In products liability actions, in order to ensure that all potentially liable parties are included in a lawsuit, subrogation professionals often include strict liability claims against products sellers within the chain of distribution for a product. In West Virginia, the Legislature recently enacted legislation, W. Va. Code § 55-7-31, designed to protect “innocent” sellers from product liability lawsuits. The legislation states that, for actions involving a product sold on or after July 6, 2017, no product liability action – i.e. a strict liability action – can be maintained against a seller unless the seller meets one of the noted exceptions.Continue Reading

In Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc., 390 P.3d 398 (Colo. 2017) (en banc), the Supreme Court of Colorado clarified the parameters for timely-filing third-party claims for indemnification or contribution in construction defects cases. The court held that C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(b)(II) – addressing when a party can file third-party indemnification and contribution claims – controls over the two-year statute of limitations period set forth in C.R.S. § 13-80-102 and the six-year statute of repose period in C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(a). Thus, in Colorado, so long as third-party ... Continue Reading

In Franklin Mut. Ins. Co. v. Castle Restoration & Constr., Inc., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2300 (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2016), the Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of a subrogating property insurer’s claim based on New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine, a doctrine that requires a party to litigate all aspects of a controversy in a single legal proceeding. Although the decision is unpublished and based on the specific factual circumstances of the case, the decision sends a cautionary reminder to insurers involved in a declaratory judgment action that they should not wait for the declaratory judgment action to be decided before taking action to protect their subrogation rights.Continue Reading

In subrogation cases where the insured’s damages were caused by a defective product, the fact that the product at issue is or was subject to a recall by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) may help to establish that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s possession and control. On January 25, 2017, the CPSC issued the following recall notice related to a product that presents a fire hazard:

Country Home Products Recalls Field & Brush Mowers Due to Fire and Burn HazardsContinue Reading

In Allstate Insurance Company v. ADT, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-517-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120880 (N.D. Ga.), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia addressed the question of whether a contract’s insurance and waiver of subrogation clause was an exculpatory clause that was unenforceable because it did not pass Georgia’s Prominence Test. The court held that a waiver of subrogation clause is not an exculpatory clause and, thus, its enforceability does not depend on the clause being prominently displayed.Continue Reading

In Adams v. Hellings Builders, Inc., 2016 Pa. Super. 192, 2016 Pa. Super. LEXIS 487, Christopher Adams and his wife, Margaret Adams (Plaintiffs), filed suit against Defendant Hellings Builders, Inc. (Hellings) to recover for moisture-related damage to their home caused by Hellings’ allegedly defective installation of stucco. Hellings filed Preliminary Objections, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim because they were not in privity with Hellings and they had no direct business dealings with Hellings.Continue Reading

Effective April 26, 2016, Georgia amended its anti-indemnification statute, Ga. Code § 13-8-2, to cover not only construction contracts, but also contracts for engineering, architectural or land surveying services. The amended statute, however, does not apply equally to construction and professional services contracts.Continue Reading

In Genuine Parts Company v. Cepec, -- A.3d --, 2016 WL 1569077 (Del. Apr. 18, 2016), the plaintiffs, Ralph and Sandra Cepec, who are Georgia residents, filed suit against, among others, Genuine Parts Company (Genuine Parts), a Georgia corporation that was properly registered to do business in Delaware. The plaintiffs filed suit to pursue asbestos-related personal injury claims having nothing to do with Genuine Parts’ activities in Delaware. Genuine Parts moved to dismiss the claims against it for lack of general and specific personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied Genuine Parts’ motion, finding that, by complying with Delaware’s statute requiring foreign corporations to register to do business in Delaware and to appoint an in-state agent for service of process, Genuine Parts consented to general jurisdiction in Delaware. Because the Superior Court based its finding on a theory of express consent to personal jurisdiction, the court did not conduct a due process inquiry.Continue Reading

In Cumberland Insurance Group v. Delmarva Power d/b/a Delmarva Power & Light Company, 130 A. 3d 1183 (Md. App. 2016), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland (the Court) addressed an issue of first impression: the appropriate spoliation sanction when the physical object that was destroyed is, itself, the subject of the litigation. The Court, finding that the plaintiff was at fault and that the destruction of the house at issue irreparably prejudiced the defendant’s ability to defend the case, held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the plaintiff’s case as a spoliation sanction.Continue Reading

In subrogation cases where the insured’s damages were caused by a defective product, the fact that the product at issue is or was subject to a recall by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) may help to establish that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s possession and control. On March 31, 2016, the CPSC issued the following recall notices related to products that present fire hazards:

CE North America Expands Recall of Fan Heaters Due to Fire Hazard; Sold Exclusively at H-E-B

Gamewell-FCI Recalls Fire Alarm Panels Due to Failure to Alert of a Fire ... Continue Reading

In Severn Peanut Company, Inc. v. Industrial Fumigant Company, 807 F.3d 88 (4^th Cir. (N.C.) 2015), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit), applying North Carolina law, considered whether a consequential damages clause in a contract between the Severn Peanut Company, Inc. (Severn) and Industrial Fumigant Company (IFC) barred Severn and its subrogating insurer, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (Travelers), from recovering over $19 million in damages that Severn suffered as the result of a fire and explosion at its Severn, North Carolina plant. The Fourth Circuit, rejecting Severn’s unconscionability and public policy arguments related to the consequential damages clause and finding that the economic loss doctrine barred Severn from pursuing negligence claims, affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in IFC’s favor.Continue Reading

When an insurer, as subrogee of its insured, files suit against a defendant to recover its subrogated payments, the defendant, not infrequently, files a third-party complaint against the insured. Typically, the defendant alleges that, if it is liable, then the insured, based on his or her contributory negligence, is liable to the defendant for contribution. Insureds, however, cannot be liable in tort to themselves.Continue Reading

Many states, including Texas, have Right to Repair statutes that require homeowners to provide notice and an opportunity to repair construction defects to home builders, including contractors who build condominiums. See, e.g. Tex. Prop. Code §§ 27.001 to 27.007. With respect to condominium-related construction defect claims, Texas recently adopted additional procedural requirements that a condominium association with eight or more units must comply with “before filing suit or initiating an arbitration proceeding to resolve a claim pertaining to the construction or design of a unit or the common elements” of a condominium. See Tex. Prop. Code § 82.119 (eff. Sept. 1, 2015). Prior to filing suit or initiating an arbitration proceeding, condominium associations subject to § 82.119 must, among other things:Continue Reading

Florida’s general assembly made changes to Florida’s construction defect notice statute, Fl. St. §§ 558.001 to 558.005, et. seq., that take effect on October 1, 2015.

Florida’s construction defect notice statute is an attempt to put in place an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism for certain construction defect matters that involves, among other things, the claimant filing a notice of claim with the “contractor, subcontractor, supplier, or design professional that the claimant asserts is responsible for the defect.” Fl. St. § 558.001. The revised statute includes an intent to provide contractors, and insurers, among others, with an opportunity to resolve certain construction defect claims through confidential settlement negotiations, without resort to further legal process. Id. The revised statute does not, however, include a requirement that claimants provide notice of a claim directly to insurers.Continue Reading

By: Edward Jaeger and William Doerler

In Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So.3d 256 (Fla. 2015), the Supreme Court of Florida considered whether a party to a contract, in order to be released from liability for its own negligence, needs to include an express reference to negligence in an exculpatory clause. The court held that, unlike an indemnification clause, so long as the language in an exculpatory clause is clear, the absence of the terms “negligence” or “negligent acts” in an exculpatory clause does not, for that reason alone, render the exculpatory clause ineffective.Continue Reading

Georgia’s apportionment statute, OCGA § 51-12-33, requires a jury, in some cases, to apportion responsibility for an injury among all those who contributed to it – whether a party to the lawsuit or not – based on each person’s respective share of combined fault. After the apportionment, each defendant’s liability is limited to his or her apportioned percentage. In Zaldivar v. Prickett, -- S.E.2d --, 2015 WL 4067788 (Ga. July 6, 2015), the plaintiff, Daniel Prickett (Prickett), sued Imelda Zaldivar (Zaldivar) to recover for injuries that Pricket allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Zaldivar sought to apportion fault to a non-party, Overhead Door Company, Prickett’s employer, arguing that Overhead Door Company negligently entrusted its vehicle to Prickett. In addition to overruling prior case law precluding, as a matter of law, first-party claims based on negligent entrustment, the court considered whether “fault” can be apportioned to a tortfeasor whose negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury but who is otherwise immune from liability.Continue Reading

In Atlanta Flooring Design Centers, Inc. v. R.G. Williams Construction, Inc., -- S.E.2d --, 2015 WL 4311070 (Ga. App. July 16, 2015), the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a contract clause in a construction contract. In the contract, R.G. Williams Construction, Inc. (“Williams"), the general contractor, and Atlanta Flooring Design Centers, Inc. (“AFDC”) agreed to arbitrate any disputes related to the contract. In addition, Williams and AFDC expressly agreed “not to challenge the validity of the arbitration or the award.” The court, relying in part on analogous federal arbitration law, held that the clause – precluding judicial review of an arbitration award – altered Georgia’s statutory arbitration scheme, frustrated Georgia’s public policy and was void and unenforceable.Continue Reading

In Board of Commissioners of County of Jefferson v. Teton Corp., 30 N.E.3d 711 (Ind. 2015), Jefferson County hired Teton Corporation to perform renovation work on the Jefferson County courthouse. Teton hired subcontractors to perform the roofing work.

Jefferson County’s contract with Teton incorporated American Institute of Architects (“AIA”) General Conditions form A201-1987. The AIA contract required Jefferson County to obtain property insurance and included a waiver of subrogation clause that stated, in pertinent part:  “The Owner and Contractor waive all rights . . . for damage caused by fire or other perils to the extent covered by property insurance obtained pursuant to this Paragraph 11.3 or other property insurance applicable to the Work.” (Emphasis added). Instead of procuring a separate builder’s risk policy for the renovation work, Jefferson County relied on its existing “all risk” property insurance policy to cover the entire courthouse, including the renovation work.Continue Reading

In July of 2015, the North Carolina legislature amended N.C. Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4), which governs expert discovery. The new rule becomes effective October 1, 2015 and applies to actions commenced on or after that date.

Under the old rule, parties can obtain discovery related to trial experts by issuing expert interrogatories. Parties can also, upon motion, obtain additional discovery, such as deposition testimony and, with respect to such additional discovery, the court may require the party seeking discovery to pay a fair portion of the fees and expenses incurred by the opposing party in obtaining this additional discovery from its expert.Continue Reading

Pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), a plaintiff, under certain conditions, can voluntarily dismiss his or her complaint and file a new action based on the same claim within one year after the dismissal. In Murphy v. Hinton, -- S.E.2d --, 2015 WL 4081966 (N.C. App. July 7, 2015), the Court of Appeals of North Carolina considered whether the plaintiff, who voluntarily dismissed her wrongful death complaint without prejudice, could take advantage of Rule 41(a)(1)’s tolling provision and extend the statute of limitations for an additional year. The court, following Estrada v. Burnham, 316 N.C. 318, 341 S.E.2d 358 (1986), held that, in order to toll the statute of limitations, the original complaint must conform in all respects to the rules of pleading. The court also held that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to satisfy the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(1) because the plaintiff’s negligence claim failed to identify the duty that the plaintiff owed, failed to allege unreasonable conduct and otherwise failed to reference the essential elements of a negligence cause of action. Because the plaintiff’s complaint failed to comply with the “rudimentary notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(1),” the court held that the plaintiff could not rely on Rule 41(a)(1) to extend the statute of limitations. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint based on the statute of limitations.Continue Reading

By: Edward A. Jaeger, Jr. and William L. Doerler

In Belasco v. Wells, 183 Cal. Rptr.3d 840, 234 Cal. App. 4th 409 (2015), the California Court of Appeals for the Second District addressed the question of whether a homeowner, when settling an administrative complaint against a licensed homebuilder, can release future, unknown claims. Despite the presence of a California statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 1542, stating that a general release does not extend to claims that the releasor does not know about, the court held that the homeowner’s express release of future claims was enforceable. Thus, the homeowner’s release - signed as part of a 2006 settlement of the homeowner’s construction defect claims against the defendant, a homebuilder - barred the homeowner’s 2012 claims against the builder based on latent defects in the roof of the home that the homeowner discovered in 2011.Continue Reading

By: Edward A. Jaeger, Jr. and William L. Doerler

In Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., -- A.3d --, 2014 WL 6474923 (Pa. Nov. 19, 2014), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s products liability law and, overturning prior precedent, clarified the law. In particular, the Court, overturned Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company, 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), clarified the role of the judge and the jury in products liability cases and settled the question of whether Pennsylvania would adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §§ ... Continue Reading

By: Edward A. Jaeger, Jr. and William L. Doerler

In Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Engineers, Inc., 312 P.3d 620 (Wash. 2013), the Supreme Court of Washington, in a 5-4 decision, addressed the application of the economic loss rule – more properly considered the independent duty doctrine – in a case where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant committed professional malpractice. Although the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims were not barred by the economic loss rule, the analysis adopted by the Supreme Court ... Continue Reading

By: Edward A. Jaeger, Jr. and William L. Doerler

In Rinehart, et. al. v. Morton Buildings, Inc., -- P.3d --, 2013 WL 3835833 (Kan. July 26, 2013), the Supreme Court of Kansas addressed the question of whether the economic loss doctrine (ELD) applied to bar a negligent misrepresentation claim by a party who was not in privity with the defendant, Morton Buildings, Inc. (Morton). Although the Court of Appeals of Kansas held that the doctrine did not apply because the plaintiff, Midwest Slitting, LLC (Midwest Slitting), was not in privity with Morton, the Supreme Court declined the ... Continue Reading

By: Edward A. Jaeger, Jr. and William L. Doerler

In Mayer v. Once Upon a Rose, Inc., 58 A.3d 1221 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2013), the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court addressed the question of whether, despite the fact that the plaintiff had invoked the res ipsa loquitur (res ipsa) doctrine, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict in the defendant’s favor because the plaintiff did not have a liability expert. The Appellate Division held that the plaintiff did not need a liability expert to pursue its case because the matters at issue did not require ... Continue Reading

by: Edward A. Jaeger, Jr. and William L. Doerler

In Nationwide Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Pepper Construction, Inc., -- A.3d --, 2013 WL 313933 (R.I. Jan. 28, 2013), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed the question of whether the anti-subrogation rule precluded Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Nationwide) from pursuing a subrogation action against a corporation solely owned by its insured. Recognizing that the corporation owned by Nationwide's insured is a separate and distinct legal entity from Nationwide's insured, the court held that the ... Continue Reading