The Subrogation Strategist

In American Fam. Ins. Co. v. NB Elec., Inc., No. A24-0377, 2025 Minn. App. LEXIS 12, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota (Court of Appeals) considered whether an insurer’s subrogation action was time barred under Minnesota’s two-year statute of limitations period. At issue was whether the statute of limitations began to run when the insured homeowner terminated the general contractor or when construction, with a new general contractor, was complete. Because the construction project did not terminate upon the replacement of the general contractor, the Court of Appeals found ... Continue Reading

The discovery rule applies to latent injuries, such that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of or should have known of the injury. In Western World Ins. Group v. KC Welding, LLC, No. 2022-CA-00527-SCT, 2023 Miss. LEXIS 278 (KC Welding), a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court of Mississippi (Supreme Court) affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Western World Insurance Group (Insurer) filed its lawsuit one day late. Thus, the statute of limitations barred Insurer’s lawsuit.

In KC Welding, on July 12, 2018, KC Welding, LLC (KC Welding) sent an employee to Sunbelt Shavings, LLC (Sunbelt) to repair the door of a box containing wood chips. Sunbelt’s employees discovered that KC Welding employees were welding a storage bin that had not been emptied of wood chips and Sunbelt’s employees asked KC Welding’s employees to leave. After that, Sunbelt’s employees attempted to soak the area with water. Later than night, a fire started on Sunbelt’s property, apparently as the result of smoldering wood shavings, a fire that was extinguished on July 13, 2018.Continue Reading

In Nationwide Prop & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fireline Corp., No. 1:20-cv-00684, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104241, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (District Court) considered whether the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims fell within the scope of a previously formed agreement, thereby rendering the plaintiff’s claims subject to the agreement’s time limitation and waiver of subrogation provisions. The District Court found that the claims fell within the scope of the agreement.

In Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. FDH Infrastructure Servs. LLC., No. 3D22-1143, 2023 Fla. App. LEXIS 3662, the Court of Appeals of Florida, Third District (Court of Appeals) addressed whether Florida’s two-year statute of limitations governing professional malpractice actions or  four-year statute of limitations governing improvements to real property was applicable to a claim involving a construction accident due to erroneous structural engineering calculations. The Court of Appeals determined that the four-year statute governing improvements to real property was more specific and governed only construction-based claims and, thus, was the appropriate governing statute.

On April 13, 2023, Florida’s governor, Ron DeSantis, signed into law SB 360 which, among other things, shortens the statute of repose period for improvements to real property. The law also revises the date on which the statute of limitations period runs for these types of damage claims. Florida’s revision of this law provides further evidence of the state’s tort reform efforts.Continue Reading

On April 7, 2023, New Mexico’s governor, Michelle Lujan Grisham, signed into law New Mexico’s Right to Repair Act (Act), 2023 N.M. SB 50. The Act’s effective date is July 1, 2023. The Act applies to construction defects in dwellings, i.e., newly constructed single family housing units designed for residential use. The Act applies to not only newly constructed housing units but also to systems and other components and improvements that are part of the housing unit at the time of construction.

Pursuant to the Act, except for construction defect claims that involve an immediate ... Continue Reading

On Friday, March 24, 2023, Florida’s governor, Ron DeSantis, signed into law a tort reform bill, HB 837.  The bill impacts, among other things, bad faith actions and attorney’s fee awards.  Of particular importance to subrogation professionals are provisions impacting comparative fault, the statute of limitations and premises liability with respect to the criminal acts of third persons.

With respect to the statute of limitations, the bill amended Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) and (4), to reduce the statute of limitations for negligence actions from four (4) years to two (2) years.

As for comparative fault, Fla. Stat. § 768.81 was amended to move Florida from a pure comparative fault jurisdiction for negligence actions to a modified comparative fault jurisdiction.  Pursuant to § 768.81(6), as revised, in a negligence action subject to that section, “any party found to be greater than 50 percent at fault for his or her own harm may not recover any damages.”  Section 768.81(6), however, does not apply to actions for damages for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence.Continue Reading

In University of Massachusetts Building Authority v. Adams Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2023 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 28, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 1107, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts (Appeals Court) considered whether the lower court properly held that the plaintiff’s breach of contract and indemnification claims were time-barred by the statute of repose because they sounded in tort.  The Appeals Court held that while the six-year statute of repose only applies to tort claims, they can also bar claims for breach of contract and indemnification if they sound in tort.  The Appeals Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, finding that the plaintiff’s breach of contract and indemnification claims were just negligence claims disguised as non-tort claims.

In 2013 and 2014, the University of Massachusetts (UMass) retained various contractors to renovate the dining hall for one of its campus buildings, which included the installation of new ductwork for the kitchen’s exhaust system.  The dining hall opened for service in September 2014.  In the Spring of 2018, it was discovered that the ductwork for the kitchen had collapsed.  Further investigation revealed other deficiencies with the exhaust system.  On December 1, 2020, UMass filed a lawsuit against various contractors, asserting negligence, breach of contract, and indemnification. The breach of contract claims alleged breach of express warranties.Continue Reading

In Tadych v. Noble Ridge Constr., Inc., No. 100049-9, 2022 Wash. LEXIS 545, the Supreme Court of Washington (Supreme Court) considered whether the lower court erred in enforcing a one-year accelerated limitations period clause in a construction contract. The Supreme Court considered the extent to which the provision hindered the plaintiffs’ statutory rights - as set forth in Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.310 - which provides homeowners with a six-year repose period for construction defect claims.  The court found that the contractual provision’s shortening of the time period from six years to one year was a gross deprivation of the plaintiffs’ statutory rights and was unfairly one-sided in favor of the defendant.  As such, the court held that the provision was substantively unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable.Continue Reading

In Venema v. Moser Builders, Inc., 2022 PA Super. 171, 2022 Pa. Super. LEXIS 414, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (Superior Court) upheld an award of judgment on the pleadings from the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (Trial Court). The Superior Court found that Pennsylvania’s 12-year Statute of Repose for improvements to real property (Statute of Repose) began to run upon the issuance of the certificate of occupancy following original construction of the home in 2003—not from the completion of repairs to the home that continued through 2008.Continue Reading

In construction or similar ongoing projects, problems often pop up. Sometimes they can pop up again and again. Making things even more complicated, one problem may affect another, seemingly new problem. When these construction problems result in property damage, timelines tend to overlap and determining when a statute of limitation begins to run for a particular claim can be difficult. Especially in states with short statute of limitations for tort claims like Texas, knowing when a statute begins to run is crucial for a subrogation professional.Continue Reading

In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wangs Alliance Corp., No. 21-cv-10389-AK, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26712, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (District Court) considered whether a product manufacturer was barred by the Commonwealth’s six-year statute of repose for improvements to real property from joining the installer of the product as a third-party defendant. The court denied the defendant’s motion for leave to file a third-party complaint to join the installer, finding that the installer completed its work more than six years prior to the motion being filed. This case reminds us that Massachusetts’ six-year statute of repose for improvement to real property also bars a defendant’s contribution claims against third parties.Continue Reading

In Wascher v. ABC Ins. Co., No. 2020AP1961, 2022 Wisc. App. LEXIS 110 (Feb. 9, 2022), the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin considered whether the plaintiffs were barred — by Wisconsin’s 10-year statute of repose for improvements to real property claims and the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims — from bringing a lawsuit against the original builders of their home. The plaintiffs alleged negligence and breach of contract against the masonry subcontractors, asserting that they improperly installed the exterior stone cladding. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims against the original builders were time-barred.Continue Reading

Statutes of repose establish a legislature’s determination of when defendants should be free from liability. As set forth in Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 11.202, the statute of repose for construction improvements in Nevada is six years after “substantial completion.” In Somersett Owners Ass’n v. Somersett Dev. Co., 492 P.3d 534 (Nev. 2021), the Supreme Court of Nevada (Supreme Court) discussed when a construction improvement is substantially complete, as defined by the common law, for purposes of NRS 11.202. Because the plaintiff did not establish that its suit was filed within six years of when the rockery walls at issue were substantially complete, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court below.Continue Reading

In Mondoux v. Vanghel, No. 2018-219, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 2, 2021 WL 264542, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered whether to apply the “discovery rule” to toll the ten year statute of limitations in R.I. Laws § 9-1-13(a) for the plaintiffs’ action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Stated another way, the court considered when the plaintiffs’ claim accrued with respect to latent defects. Guided by public policy and the need to provide a definite end for exposure to liability as reflected in Rhode Island’s construction-related ten year statute of repose, R.I. Laws § 9-1-29, the court applied a modified discovery rule.Continue Reading

In Lennar Northeast Props. v. Barton Partners Architects Planners, Inc, C.A. No. 16-cv-12330-ADB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11800, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts considered whether a property owner’s construction defect claims against a contractor were barred by the six-year statute of repose for improvements to real property. Massachusetts’ statute of repose, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B, bars tort actions against those involved in the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property more than six years after the earlier of the dates of (1) the opening of the improvement to use; or (2) substantial completion of the improvement and the taking of possession or occupancy by the owner. Finding that, despite the fact that the plaintiff’s actions were labeled as contract, breach of warranty and consumer protection act claims, the complaint alleged actions sounding in tort. Thus, the court applied the statute of repose to these claims.Continue Reading

In D’Allesandro v. Lennar Hingham Holdings, LLC, 486 Mass 150, 2020 Mass. LEXIS 721, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts answered a certified question regarding how to apply the Massachusetts statute of repose, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B, in regards to phased construction projects. The court held that, in this context, the completion of each individual “improvement” to its intended use, or the substantial completion of the individual building and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner or owners, triggers the statute of repose with respect to the common areas and limited common areas of that building. Additionally, the court held that where a particular improvement is integral to, and intended to serve, multiple buildings (or the development as a whole), the statute of repose is triggered when the discrete improvement is substantially complete and open to its intended use.Continue Reading

In Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020), the Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, addressed whether a party’s contractual definition of the phrase “substantial completion” controlled the trigger date for California’s construction-related statute of repose, Cal. Civ. Code § 941(a). The Fourth District held that the agreement between the condominium owner and developer for Smart Corner Condominiums and the general contractor, Hensel Phelps Construction Co. (Hensel Phelps) – which determined the date of “substantial completion” for the construction project - did not control when the statute of repose started to run.Continue Reading

As discussed in a prior blog post, in Gindel v. Centex Homes, 2018 Fla.App. LEXIS 13019, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal held that when the plaintiffs provided a pre-suit notice in compliance with §558.004 of Florida’s construction defect Right-to-Cure statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 558.001 to 558.005, et. seq., they commenced a “civil action or proceeding,” i.e. an “action,” within the meaning of Florida’s construction defect Statute of Repose, Florida Statue § 95.11(3)(c). Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs commenced their action prior to the time Florida’s 10-year statute of repose period ended. In overturning the lower court’s dismissal of the action, the court found that because the Right-to-Cure statute, §558 of the Florida Statutes, sets out a series of mandatory steps that must be taken prior to bringing a judicial action, filing pre-suit notice of claim sufficiently constituted an “action” for purposes of Florida’s Statute of Repose.Continue Reading

Courts often struggle with the question of when the statute of repose starts to run for construction projects that involve multiple buildings or phases. In Village Lofts at St. Anthony Falls Ass’n v. Housing Partners III-Lofts, LLC, 937 N.W.2d 430 (Minn. 2020) (Village Lofts), the Supreme Court of Minnesota addressed how Minnesota’s 10-year statute of repose, Minn. Stat. § 541.051, applies to claims arising from the construction of a condominium complex. The court held that the statute of repose begins to run at different times for: a) statutory residential warranty claims brought pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 327A.01 to 327A.08, et. seq.; and b) common law claims arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of the condominium buildings.Continue Reading

In Penn-America Insurance Company v. Bay State Gas Company, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 757 (2019), the Appeals Court of Massachusetts considered whether the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant, arising from an alleged defect in the defendant’s natural gas line, were time-barred by the six-year statute of repose for improvements to real property. The Appeals Court held that the statute of repose did not apply to the plaintiff’s claims, which were related to the defendant’s alleged failure to maintain its property. Thus, in Massachusetts, the statute of repose does not apply if the plaintiff’s claim is rooted in the failure to maintain an improvement, rather than negligent design or construction of the improvement.Continue Reading

In D’Allesandro v. Lennar Hingham Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 17-cv-12567-IT, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185874, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently discussed a case against a general contractor and its related entities, all of whom were involved in the construction of a multi-phase construction project. The court held that, in this context, completion of the “improvement” – which was the whole project, rather than each individual phase – triggered the six-year statute of repose. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and unfair business practices claims were not claims based on the design and construction of the improvement and, thus, were not subject to the statute of repose.Continue Reading

For subrogation practitioners dealing with an installation-based statute of repose, knowing what is an improvement to real property is the first battle in what can, but does not have to be, a long fight. Like many other states, Tennessee’s statute of repose bars claims based on improvements to real property. Tennessee’s statute of repose runs four years after substantial completion of the improvement. See Tennessee Code Ann. § 28-3-202. In the case of Maddox v. Olshan Found. Repair & Waterproofing Co. of Nashville, L.P., E A, 2019 Tenn.App. LEXIS 464, 2019 WL 4464816, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee examined whether or not the work done by the defendant, Olshan Foundation Repair & Waterproofing Co. of Nashville, L.P., E.A. (Olshan) — which addressed bowing walls, cracks in the foundation and walls and water intrusion — qualified as improvements to real property for the purposes of the statute of repose. The court held that the work by Olshan essentially amounted to repairs, and did not qualify as improvements to real property.Continue Reading

In Barrett v. Berry Contr. L.P., No. 13-18-00498-CV, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 8811, the Thirteenth District Court of Appeals of Texas considered, among other things, the procedural timing requirements of filing a certificate of merit in conjunction with a complaint. The court concluded that the proper reading of the statute requires a plaintiff to file a certificate of merit with the first complaint naming the defendant as a party.Continue Reading

In Rankin v. South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc., 2019 N.H. LEXIS 165, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered, pursuant to a question transferred by the trial court, whether RSA 508:4-b, the statute of repose for improvements to real property, applies to indemnity and contribution claims. The court concluded that based upon the plain reading of the statute, it applies to indemnity and contribution claims. As noted by the court, a holding to the contrary would violate the intent of a statute of repose, which is to establish a time limit for when a party is exposed to liability.Continue Reading

Often times, properly analyzing when a statute of limitations begins to run – not just how long it runs – is crucial to timely pleading. In Dep’t of Transp. v. Seattle Tunnel Partners, 2019 Wash.App. LEXIS 281 (Was. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2019), Division Two of the Court of Appeals of Washington addressed when the discovery rule starts the statute of limitations clock on a negligence cause of action. The court held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows that the factual elements of the claim against the defendant exist. The clock starts to run even if the plaintiff wants to investigate the possibility of other contributing factors or the defendant identifies opposing viewpoints on the theory of the claim.Continue Reading

In Morse v. Fisher Asset Management, LLC, 2019 Pa. Super. 78, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania considered whether the plaintiff’s action was stayed when the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint after sustaining the defendants’ preliminary objections seeking enforcement of an arbitration clause in the contract at issue. The Superior Court—distinguishing between a defendant who files a motion to compel arbitration and a defendant who files preliminary objections based on an arbitration clause—held that, in the latter scenario, if the defendant’s preliminary objections are sustained, the statute of limitations is not tolled. This case establishes that, in Pennsylvania, plaintiffs seeking to defeat a challenge to a lawsuit based on a purported agreement to arbitrate need to pay close attention to the type of motion the defendant files to defeat the plaintiff’s lawsuit.Continue Reading

In United Services Automobile Association v. Broan-Nutone, LLC, No. 218-2017-CV-01113,[1] the Superior Court of Rockingham County, New Hampshire recently considered whether the eight-year statute of repose for improvements to real property applied to the manufacturer of a ceiling ventilation fan that was installed in the property during its original construction. The court held that New Hampshire’s statute of repose did not apply to the manufacturer because it was not involved in incorporating its product into the property.Continue Reading

In Lawrence v. General Panel Corp., 2019 S.C. LEXIS 1, No. 27856 (S.C. Jan. 1, 2019), the Supreme Court of South Carolina answered a certified question related to South Carolina’s statute of repose, S.C. Code § 15-3-640,[1] to wit, whether the date of “substantial completion of the improvement” is always measured from the date on which the certificate of occupancy is issued. The court held that a 2005 amendment to § 15-3-640 did not change South Carolina law with respect to the date of substantial completion. Thus, under the revised version of § 15-3-640, “the statute of repose begins to run at the latest on the date of the certificate of occupancy, even if there is ongoing work on any particular part of the project.” A brief review of prior case law may assist with understanding the court’s ruling in Lawrence. Continue Reading

In Gindel v. Centex Homes, 2018 Fla.App. LEXIS 13019, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal recently concluded that the date on which the plaintiffs provided a pre-suit notice in compliance with §558.004 of Florida’s construction defect Right-to-Cure statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 558.001 to 558.005, et. seq., is the date on which the plaintiff commenced a “civil action or proceeding,” i.e. an “action,” within the meaning of Florida’s construction defect statute of repose, Florida Statue § 95.11(3)(c). Thus, reversing the decision of the trial court, the Fourth District held that the plaintiffs timely-filed their construction defect action against the defendants.Continue Reading

Earlier this summer, in Gables & Villas at River Oaks Homeowners Ass’n v. Castlewood Builders LLC, 2018 UT 28, the Supreme Court of Utah addressed the question of whether the plaintiff’s construction defects claims against the general contractor for a construction project were timely-filed, or barred by the statute of repose. In Utah, the statute of repose requires that an action be “commenced within six years of the date of completion.” The plaintiff alleged that its 2014 amended complaint naming the general contractor as a defendant was timely-commenced because, before the date on which Utah’s statute of repose ran, a defendant filed a motion to amend its third-party complaint to name the general contractor as a defendant, and the defendant subsequently assigned its claims to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the filing of its 2014 amended complaint related back[1] to the date of its original complaint. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an action is “commenced” by filing a complaint and that a motion for leave to amend does not count as “commencing” an action.Continue Reading

Under Florida’s construction-related statute of repose, Fla. Stat. § 95.11, actions based on the design, planning or construction of an improvement to real property are barred if not commenced within 10 years after the later of several possible dates, including the date of actual possession by the owner and the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. The Florida Legislature recently amended the statute to extend the time within which defendants subject to a suit filed close to the end of the 10-year period can file claims. Under the revised law, a defendant can file “counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims up to 1 year after the pleading to which such claims relate is served.” Regardless of when the cause of action at issue accrued, the law applies to actions commenced on or after July 1, 2018, except that any action that would not have been barred under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(c) prior to the amendment may be commenced before July 1, 2019.Continue Reading

In Molina v. Gears, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1978 (March 20, 2018), the Texas Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff who timely-filed a complaint exercised due diligence with respect to serving the complaint. The court held that, to “bring suit” within a statute of limitations period, a plaintiff must file the complaint within the statutory timeframe and use due diligence to serve the defendant with process.Continue Reading

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a plaintiff may bring strictly state-based claims in federal district court if they are related to a claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction. This is more commonly known as Supplemental Jurisdiction. One major issue that has arisen when such jurisdiction is asserted is whether or not the applicable state-specific statute of limitations is tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) upon the filing of the federal action. Recently, the Supreme Court addressed this very issue in Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S.Ct. 594 (2018).Continue Reading

In Palisades at Fort Lee Condominium Association v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, et al., 2017 N.J. LEXIS 845 (Palisades), the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed how the discovery rule – which tolls the statute of limitations – applies in construction defect cases. The court clarified that, when a building has multiple owners, the statute of limitations begins to run when the first owner – be it an original or subsequent owner – in the line of building owners reasonably knew or should have known of the basis for a cause of action.Continue Reading

When the validity of a construction defect claim depends on whether the claim is barred by the applicable state’s statute of repose, it is important to review the statute to identify when claims subject to the statute of repose accrue. In Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC, 219 So.3d 93 (Fla. Ct. App. (5^th Dist.) 2017), the Court of Appeals of Florida clarified the accrual date for the statute of repose in cases where the accrual date depends on a construction contract’s completion date. Pursuant to Busch, the date of full performance under the contract, not the building’s purchase closing date, is the date on which claims accrue.Continue Reading

In Damon v. Vista Del Norta Dev., LLC, -- P.3d --, 2016-NMCA-083, 2016 N.M. App. Lexis 52 (N.M. Ct. App.), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico addressed the trigger date for the ten-year statute of repose for a physical improvement of real property. Adopting a nuanced approach to interpreting the statute’s three-prong trigger test, the court made it clear that the type of “improvement” at issue is specific to each defendant. Thus, there can be separate statute of repose accrual dates for each different defendant.Continue Reading

In Dominguez v. Hayward Industries, Inc., Certified Gunite Company d/b/a Custom Pools, and John M. Pieklo, -- So.3d ----, 2015 WL 5438782 (3d DCA Sept. 16, 2015), the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, discussed whether products liability claims related to a pool filter, a component part of a pool system, were subject to Florida’s twelve-year products liability statute of repose, section 95.031, Florida Statutes. The court held that a pool filter does not constitute an improvement to real property and, thus, the plaintiffs’ claims were subject to the statute of repose.Continue Reading

Pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), a plaintiff, under certain conditions, can voluntarily dismiss his or her complaint and file a new action based on the same claim within one year after the dismissal. In Murphy v. Hinton, -- S.E.2d --, 2015 WL 4081966 (N.C. App. July 7, 2015), the Court of Appeals of North Carolina considered whether the plaintiff, who voluntarily dismissed her wrongful death complaint without prejudice, could take advantage of Rule 41(a)(1)’s tolling provision and extend the statute of limitations for an additional year. The court, following Estrada v. Burnham, 316 N.C. 318, 341 S.E.2d 358 (1986), held that, in order to toll the statute of limitations, the original complaint must conform in all respects to the rules of pleading. The court also held that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to satisfy the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(1) because the plaintiff’s negligence claim failed to identify the duty that the plaintiff owed, failed to allege unreasonable conduct and otherwise failed to reference the essential elements of a negligence cause of action. Because the plaintiff’s complaint failed to comply with the “rudimentary notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(1),” the court held that the plaintiff could not rely on Rule 41(a)(1) to extend the statute of limitations. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint based on the statute of limitations.Continue Reading